NOTES

EIDELSON V RCHER EXHAUSTION OF
REMEDIES IN A PRIVATE HOSPITAL
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Eidelson v. Archer,' the Alaska Supreme Court for the first
time applied the exhaustion of remedies doctrine to a private hospital proceeding. The unanimous court 2 did not decide whether the
hospital was purely private or quasi-public. 3 It nevertheless held
that before challenging the revocation of hospital staff privileges in
the courts, a physician must exhaust the hospital's internal review
procedures.
In 1977, the executive committee of the privately owned Alaska
Hospital and Medical Center summarily suspended Dr. Gary
Archer's staff privileges while investigating allegations of his misconduct.4 Later, he was formally notified of his suspension, the reasons
for it, and his right to a hearing under the hospital's bylaws.5 Instead
of requesting such a hearing, Archer filed a motion in superior court
against the hospital alleging wrongful removal, intentional interference with contract, and defamation. Before trial the complaint was
amended to substitute for the initial charges a single charge of
wrongful use of the hospital's bylaws.6 The jury returned a verdict
Copyright © 1984 by Alaska Law Review
1. 645 P.2d 171 (Alaska 1982). On remand the case was dismissed and attorney's fees were awarded. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed this disposition of
the case in an unpublished memorandum opinion. Archer v. Eidelson, No. 132
(Aug. 31, 1983) (disposition reported in ALASKA SUP. CT. MONTHLY ACTIVITY REP.
(Aug. 1983)).
2. Justice Connor did not participate.
3. 645 P.2d at 175-76 n.13.
4. Id at 173-74.
5. Id at 174. THE ALASKA HoSP. AND MEDICAL CENTER BYLAWS, art. VII,

§ 2(b), reprintedin Eidelson, 645 P.2d at 174 n.9, provided:
A practitioner whose clinical privileges have been summarily sus-

pended shall be entitled to request that the executive committee of the
medical staff hold a hearing on the matter within such reasonable time
period thereafter as the executive committee may be convened in accordance with Article VIII of these bylaws.
6. The wrongful use claim derived from the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 680 (1976), which states:

One who takes an active part in the initiation, continuation or procure-
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in favor of Archer and awarded compensatory and punitive damages.7 The hospital appealed. The Alaska Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies applied and that
the exceptions to the doctrine were inapplicable. 8

Chief Justice Rabinowitz, writing for the court, began the opinion by analyzing the basic principles behind the exhaustion doc-

trine.9 The Eidelson court found that the benefits of allowing a

public agency to create factual records, apply its expertise, and correct its own errors would also accrue to a private hospital if the exhaustion of remedies doctrine were applied to the hospital's peer

review procedures.' 0 After balancing the hospital's interest in main-

taining the integrity of its internal procedures against Archer's inter-

est in adequate redress of his grievances, the court-, concluded there
was no reason to hold that the exhaustion rule was inapplicable or
that immediate judicial intervention was necessary." The court rejected Archer's asserted justifications for failing to exhaust the inter-

nal hospital procedures: improper notice, invalidity of the
suspension due to a lack of probable cause and a failure to provide a

hearing prior to suspension, and the unavailability of an impartial
tribunal to review the suspension. After scrutinizing the procedure

set out in the bylaws, the court determined that the internal remedies
adequately protected Archer's interests and that the actual proceed2

ings had not been tainted by any hospital wrongdoing.'

ment of civil proceedings against another before an administrative board
that has power to take action adversely affecting the legally protected interests of the other, is subject to liability for any special harm caused
thereby, if
(a) he acts without probable cause to believe that the charge or claim
on which the proceedings are based may be well founded, and primarily
for a purpose other than that of securing appropriate action by the board,
and
(b) except where they are ex parte, the proceedings have terminated in
favor of the person against whom they are brought.
On appeal, in addition to the exhaustion of remedies argument, the hospital asserted
that the disciplinary procedures were not proceedings before an "administrative
board" and therefore Archer's claim under section 680 was improper. Eidelson, 645
P.2d at 173 n.4. The court chose to limit its decision to the exhaustion doctrine,
thereby making it unnecessary to address this issue.
7. Eidelson, 645 P.2d at 173.
8. Id at 179, 183.
9. Id at 176 (quoting McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969), and Van
Hyning v. University of Alaska, 621 P.2d 1354 (Alaska), cert. denied,454 U.S. 958
(1981)).
10. 645 P.2d at 177.
11. Id at 177-78.
12. Id at 179-83.
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II.

BLURRING THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DICHOTOMY

Traditionally, the administrative decisions and internal procedures of apublichospital have been subject to judicial review; conversely, private hospital procedures and decisions have been
considered beyond judicial scrutiny.1 3 Under this traditional rule,
the disgruntled physician in a private hospital had no recourse in the
courts except when the hospital's action was deemed contrary to hospital rules and regulations.1 4 This approach reflected the long-standing distinction between public and private institutions.
Recently, the Alaska courts have eroded this bright-line distinction by determining that a hospital which receives government funds
or which is the only hospital serving the community in the area is
deemed to be a quasi-public institution.1 5 The internal procedures
like those of public instituand decisions of quasi-public institutions,
6
tions, are subject to judicial review.'
Even though the Eidelson court did not actually decide whether
the Alaska Hospital and Medical Center was a quasi-public or private hospital,' 7 it held that the exhaustion of remedies doctrine applied. 18 Thus, the court in effect decided that the exhaustion of remedies doctrine applied to private hospitals. By requiring remedies to
be exhausted in a private hospital, the court has almost completely
eroded the distinction between public and private institutions. The
decision to apply the doctrine to private hospitals required analyzing
the principles behind the doctrine and examining the possible exceptions to the doctrine;' 9 an analysis of the exceptions involved evaluating the adequacy of internal hospital procedures and their ability
to protect the doctor's interests. 20 Such an approach necessitated
scrutiny of the procedures and decisions of a private hospital which
were previously beyond judicial review.
Without deciding whether the court's decision to blur the public-private distinction was correct, this note contends that once the
court has delved into the workings of a private hospital, little difference exists between public and private hospitals. When exhaustion
of remedies is required, both types of hospitals should provide some
13. See Note, Denialof HospitalStaff Privileges: Hearing and JudicialReview,
56 IowA L. REv. 1351, 1374 (1971).
14. See Note, The Physician'sRight to Hospital Staff Membership: The PublicPrivate Dichotomy, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 485, 492.
15. See Storrs v. Lutheran Hosp. & Homes Sot'y, 609 P.2d 24 (Alaska 1980),
a1 7'd, 661 P.2d 632 (Alaska 1983).
16. See, e.g., id
17. 645 P.2d at 175 n.13.

18. Id at 179.
19. See infra notes 21-68 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 69-108 and accompanying text.
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modicum of procedural safeguards. This note examines the court's
scrutiny of a private hospital's procedures and proposes guidelines
which should govern the application of the exhaustion doctrine and

its exceptions in both public and private hospitals.
III.

PRINCIPLES BEHIND THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION
OF REMEDIES

Exhaustion of remedies is a well-established doctrine in administrative law.2 1 The doctrine provides that "no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed
administrative remedy has been exhausted. '22 The rationales for applying the exhaustion doctrine are numerous and varied. 23 The
United States Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that the doctrine should not be blindly applied.2 4 Accordingly, the principles behind the doctrine must be carefully examined and each supporting
rationale should be given appropriate weight in light of the criticism
of the rationale and the facts of the particular case. The Eidelson
court enunciated four basic rationales which courts and commenta25
tors have both lauded and attacked.
A.

Agency Expertise

The first reason stated by the Eidelson court for applying the
doctrine was to allow the agency to perform functions within its special competence. 26 A hospital board presumably has expertise in determining the professional competence of its staff doctors in relation
21. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 20.01 (1958 &
Supp. 1970); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 424 (1965).
22. Meyers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938) (footnote omitted); see also McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969).
23. See, e.g., ACLU, DEMOCRACY IN TRADE UNIONS 73 (1943) (an exhaustion
requirement improves the organization's internal appellate process which benefits
all members); Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phasesof Unionism:Administrative
and Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationshop, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1435
(1963) (an exhaustion requirement promotes the democratic values of self government and private decisionmaking); Chafee, The InternalAffairs ofAssociations Not
For Profit, 43 HARV. L. REV. 993 (1930); Note, Developments in the Law." Judicial
ControlofActions ofPrivateAssociations,76 HARV. L. REV. 983 (1963) (an exhaustion requirement serves society by minimizing governmental interference and
thereby promoting the autonomy of private associations).
24. See McKart, 395 U.S. at 200.
25. The four rationales were: agency expertise, development of a factual record,
internal correction of errors, and contract theory. 645 P.2d at 176-79. See infra notes
26-48 and accompanying text.
26. Eidelson, 645 P.2d at 176 (quoting Van Hyning v. University of Alaska, 621
P.2d 1354, 1355 (Alaska), cert. denied,454 U.S. 958 (1981)).
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to the personnel needs and facilities of the hospital. 27 A hospital
board is in a unique position to evaluate the performance of a staff
physician because of its intimate knowledge of the technical aspects
of medicine, as well as its daily contact with hospital operations. Because of this expertise, courts have traditionally declined to intervene
until all internal remedies have been exhausted. 28
This deference to expertise, however, is misapplied where, as in
Eidelson, the plaintiff attacked the validity, adequacy, or use of the
internal hospital procedures. 29 In such a case, the plaintiff is not
challenging the findings regarding his medical qualifications, the
area in which the hospital has expertise; rather, the plaintiff is challenging the fairness of such procedures and the violation of his rights
from the application of the procedures. The latter are areas in which
courts, not hospitals, possess expertise. 30 Under these circumstances,
the expertise of the hospital board alone should not preclude judicial
intervention to protect the plaintiff's rights.
B. Development of a Factual Record
The Eidelson court also concluded that the exhaustion doctrine
was applicable because it promotes judicial efficiency by unearthing
the relevant evidence and providing a factual record for the courts to
review. 3 ' The utility, however, of spending agency time to uncover
facts and to develop a record is often limited. In many cases, the
internal procedures are so informal that the record provided inadequately defines the issues and facts necessary for judicial review. 32
Under such circumstances, the court has saved nothing by requiring
exhaustion of remedies.
Placing importance on creating a factual record at the agency
level is also inappropriate when the procedures themselves are challenged. The issues of prior hearings, impartial tribunals, and notice
are purely legal, needing little factual development. "The only result
of requiring an exhaustion of administrative remedies where only a
27. Eidelson, 645 P.2d at 177 (quoting Garrow v. Elizabeth Gen. Hosp. & Dispensary, 79 N.J. 549, 559, 401 A.2d 533, 538 (1979)); see also Sosa v. Board of Managers, 437 F.2d 173, 177 (5th Cir. 1971).
28. See Garrow,79 N.J. at 559-60, 401 A.2d at 538 (quoting Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 403, 192 A.2d 817, 825 (1963)).
29. Doctor Archer attacked the adequacy and validity of the hospital's disciplinary procedures. He alleged that the procedures failed to give him a hearing,
proper notice, and an impartial appellate tribunal. Eidelson, 645 P.2d at 179-80.
30. See Garrow,79 N.J. at 570, 401 A.2d at 543 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
31. 645 P.2d at 177 (quoting Westlake Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, 17
Cal. 3d 465, 476, 551 P.2d 410, 416, 131 Cal. Rptr. 90, 96 (1976)).
32. See Blumrosen, supra note 23, at 1457; see also Summers, The Law of Union
Discvline: What the Courts Do In Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175, 211 (1960).
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question of law is in issue would be useless delay; in the interests of
justice this cannot be countenanced. ' 33 Thus, the need to create a
factual record should not be overemphasized when balancing the interest in requiring exhaustion with the need to protect the plaintiff
through judicial intervention.
C.

Internal Correction of Errors

The Eidelson court also considered the time and expense saved
by allowing an agency to discover and correct its own errors. 34 If the
complaining party prevailed before the hospital board, judicial proceedings would be unnecessary and other damages would be mini35
mized because of the expedited reversal of the initial decision.
Even though this may be a valid reason for applying the exhaustion
doctrine in some cases, the court should not overlook the 36
fact that in
many cases time and expense will not, in fact, be saved.
It has been suggested that it is naive to believe that a hospital
which has made a preliminary decision to deny staff privileges will
reverse that decision on appeal. 37 Requiring a plaintiff to exhaust
internal procedures in such an instance would be an exercise in futility if the goal of exhaustion is to allow the agency to correct its own
errors.
In addition, before too much weight is attached to this goal of
exhaustion, the court should be certain that the administrative proceedings can resolve a dispute more quickly than can the courts.
Unless the hospital can handle the case more quickly than the court,
it is inequitable to require the plaintiff to exhaust administrative
remedies. "More than one private litigant has died on the vine in an
attempt to exhaust an inexorably inexhaustible (in time) administra33. Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 9 N.J. 477, 487, 89 A.2d 13, 17 (1952); see also Goodwin v. City of Louisville, 309 Ky. 11, 15, 215 S.W.2d 557, 559 (1948); St. Luke's
Hosp. v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 320 Mass. 467, 470, 70 N.E.2d 10, 12 (1946); 2
COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 578 (1965).
34. 645 P.2d at 176-77; see also Van Hyning v. University of Alaska, 621 P.2d
1354, 1355-56 (Alaska) cert. denied,454 U.S. 958, (1981); Comment, Exhaustion of
Remedies in Private, Voluntary Associations, 65 YALE L.J. 369, 376 (1956).
35. See Westlake Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 465, 476, 551
P.2d 410, 416, 131 Cal. Rptr. 90, 96 (1976).
36. This rationale for exhaustion was correctly considered in Eidelson. The bylaws provided for a quick hearing to review the preliminary decision. Article VIII,
section 3 provided for a hearing within ten days after receipt of a request for a
hearing. Eidelson, 645 P.2d at 178 n.18. Under these circumstances, allowing the
hospital to correct its own errors would have saved time.
37. See Garrow, 79 N.J. at 571, 401 A.2d at 544 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
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the manifest
tive remedy, when had there been access to the courts
'38
justice of his case would have removed the stigma.

D. "Contract" Theory
Another factor the court examined was the contractual relationship between the hospital and Archer, and to what extent that relationship bound him to the hospital bylaws. The court stated that "in
Archer agreed to
accepting an appointment to the medical staff,
' 39
abide by the provisions of the hospital bylaws."
As a general rule, the parties to a contract must exhaust the
40

remedies provided by the contract before seeking judicial relief.

The hospital's constitution and bylaws form a contract between the

staff and hospital. As long as a board adheres to its rules there is no
41
breach of contract and the doctor is not entitled to judicial relief.
The contract theory, however, has been the subject of extensive criticism; its critics suggest that contract theory is an inadequate justifica-

doctrine where the contract arises
tion for the exhaustion of remedies
42
from an adhesion situation.

Under the contract theory, the hospital bylaws and constitution
essentially become incorporated into the doctor's employment contract. However, the hospital-staff contract is much like an adhesion
contract; 43 a physician seeking a staff position rarely has the oppor-

tunity to bargain for a change in the bylaws. 44 In the usual adhesion

38. Netterville, The Administrative ProcedureAct: .4 Study in Interpretation,20
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 86 (1951).
39. 645 P.2d at 178. Article III of the Bylaws provided:
Every application for staff appointment shall be signed by the applicant
and shall contain the applicant's specific acknowledgement of every medical staff member's obligations to provide continuous care and supervision
of his patients, to abide by the medical staff bylaws, rules and regulations,
to accept committee assignments, to accept consultation assignments, and
to participate in staffing the emergency service area and other special care
units.
Reprintedin Eidelson, 645 P.2d at 178 n. 18.
40. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 959 v. King, 572 P.2d 1168,
1172 n.9 (Alaska 1977); Holderby v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local
112, 45 Cal. 2d 843, 846, 291 P.2d 463, 466 (1955).
41. See Note, Expulsion and Exclusion From Hospital Practice and Organized
MedicalSocieties, 15 RUTGERS L. REV. 327, 330-31 (1961).
42. See infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
43. Westlake, 17 Cal. 3d at 480, 551 P.2d at 419, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 99; See Note,
supra note 41, at 330-31; cf. Blumrosen, supra note 23, at 1458 (comparing unionemployee contracts to adhesion contracts). A hospital-staff contract does differ from
a typical adhesion contract in that, although the constitution and bylaws set out
contract terms which are not subject to bargaining, the physician may bargain for
salary and benefits.
44. The California Supreme Court in Westlake, 17 Cal. 3d at 480, 551 P.2d at
419, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 99, stated that clauses incorporated into hospital bylaws "constitute the epitome of an adhesion provision, offered to affected doctors strictly on a
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situation, such as an auto sales contract, the court construes the contract to protect the weaker bargaining party for public policy reasons. 45 Like the relationship between automobile buyer and seller,
there is a great disparity in bargaining power between doctor and
hospital. Without staff privileges, it is extremely difficult for a doctor
to practice medicine. 4 6 Accordingly, the hospital has a bargaining
advantage, 47 and a physician may be forced to accept contract terms
and hospital review procedures that are far from adequate. Strict enforcement of such a contract often goes against the principle that
where there is a great disparity in bargaining power, the court will
protect the weaker party by not enforcing the offending provisions. 48
Requiring exhaustion of remedies simply because certain procedures
are stated in the bylaws and constitution may be unfair to the staff
physician and violate the public policy reflected in the adhesion doctrine. Consequently, courts should not give an inordinate amount of
weight to the contract theory when deciding whether to require exhaustion of remedies.
E.

Need for Caution in Application of the Principles

The efficiency of applying a particular rationale supporting the
exhaustion doctrine depends on the facts of the case under review. A
court must be careful not to cite the litany of principles behind the
exhaustion doctrine without carefully examining how they fit the
facts of the case at hand. A mechanical application could lead to
gross unfairness to the expelled doctor and ultimately consume more
agency and court time than was initially saved by the administrative
procedure. The doctrine has the potential to provide both the doctor
'take it or leave it basis.'" Although the court was discussing exculpatory clauses in
a physician's contract, the rationale applies equally to other parts of a hospital's
bylaws and constitution.
45. For an analysis of adhesion contracts in automobile sales, see Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
46. Foster v. Mobile County Hosp. Bd., 398 F.2d 227, 229 (5th Cir. 1968) (quoting Wyatt v. Tahoe Forest Hosp. Dist., 174 Cal. App. 2d 709, 715, 345 P.2d 93, 97
(1959) ("It is common knowledge that a physician or surgeon who is not permitted
to practice his profession in a hospital is as a practical matter denied the right to
fully practice his profession.")).
47. Westlake, 17 Cal. 3d at 480, 551 P.2d at 419, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 99 ("Such
institutions [hospitals] certainly occupy a 'superior bargaining position' to an individual physician with respect to the granting or withholding of their own membership privileges.").
48. See Inman v. Clyde Hall Drilling Co., 369 P.2d 498, 500 (Alaska 1962)
(quoting United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 327-28 (1942)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The fundamental principle of law that the courts will
not enforce a bargain where one party has unconscionably taken advantage. . . of
the other has found expression in an almost infinite variety of cases.")).
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and the hospital with a means of settling their conflicts without unnecessarily damaging themselves or the public.49 It is the court's responsibility to examine carefully the reasons behind the doctrine
before applying it, to insure that this potential is realized.
IV.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PRIVATE HOSPITALS THROUGH

GENERAL EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXHAUSTION OF
REMEDIES DOCTRINE

Following E'delson, an aggrieved staff physician at a private
hospital is required to exhaust internal remedies before seeking judicial relief. With the imposition of the exhaustion doctrine comes the
need to scrutinize the doctrine's various exceptions to determine
whether an exemption is justified in the particular case. This judicial
scrutiny conflicts with the traditional rule that the internal processes
and decisions of a private hospital are not reviewable. The exhaustion rule, however, cannot be applied without reviewing its possible
exceptions. Since this review requires examining internal hospital
procedures, the application of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine
and its exceptions may lead Alaska courts to review many aspects of
procedures which until now have been beyond judiprivate hospital
50
cial scrutiny.
The exhaustion of remedies doctrine is riddled with exceptions.5 1 Indeed, there are so many exceptions that some commentators have concluded that nothing of substance is left to the doctrine
because courts can virtually avoid it at will.52 Exceptions were developed because strict application of the doctrine may, in some cases,
lead to unduly harsh results. Thus, the courts have allowed certain
litigants to circumvent the exhaustion requirement by invoking an
exception. A litigant seeking exemption from exhaustion will most
unjust
frequently assert the following exceptions: illusory remedies,
53
burden on the plaintiff, and inadequate procedures.
A. Illusory Remedy
Remedies are considered illusory when there is no provision for
49. Cf. Note, supra note 13, at 1377 (referring to a fair hearing and the right to
judicial review).
50. Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Tennessee, and Vermont allow some judicial review of
private administrative decisions. See generally,Annot., 37 A.L.R. 3D 645, 661-63

(1971 & Supp. 1983).
51. See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969).
52. See, e.g., Vorenberg, Exhaustion of Intraunion Remedies, 2 LAB.

(1951).

53. See Note, supra note 41, at 330.

L.J. 487
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them in the organization's constitution or bylaws 54 or when they become available only after a suit has been instituted.5 5 Some courts
have determined that an appearance before a board that has no
power to redress the wrong is also an illusory remedy.5 6 Exhaustion
of internal remedies will not be required when the plaintiff has no
adequate, efficient, or usable method of appeal within the organization.57 If the procedures will not yield a remedy the court will generally excuse the plaintiff from exhaustion.
To require exhaustion in such cases [involving inadequate and illusory remedies] would be to permit use of the rule as a defensive
vehicle to avoid granting any relief to a member by adding delaying and expensive preliminary and inconclusive procedures. This
would be a disservice to the aggrieved parties, a [poor] reflection
58
on the association and an abrogation of judicial responsibility.
In cases where an illusory remedy would lead to injustice, an exception to the exhaustion rule is appropriate.
B.

Unjust Burden

The courts also allow the doctrine to be circumvented if the exhaustion of internal remedies would unjustly burden the plaintiff.
To determine whether the burden is unjust, courts examine the time,
expense, geographic inaccessibility, and the injuries suffered by the
plaintiff in the interim between suspension and hearing or appeal. 59
The amount of time before appeal and the expense will vary among
hospitals, depending on each institution's particular constitution and
bylaws. The more intricate the appellate procedure, the greater the
cost. An attorney may be required and other expenses, such as discovery and stenography costs, that are not present in a less formal
process may arise in preparing for a more formal hearing. Geographic inaccessibility is usually unimportant in hospital-staff dismissals because generally both the doctor and hospital are located in
60
the same community.
The most important factor in determining whether exhaustion
places an unjust burden on the plaintiff is the injury he suffers before
and during the organization's appellate process. A physician's in54. Cf. Hooper v. Stone, 54 Cal. App. 668, 673, 202 P. 485, 487 (1921) (organization did not provide an appellate tribunal).
55. See Armstrong v. Duffy, 90 Ohio App. 233, 251, 103 N.E.2d 760, 769 (1951).
56. See cases cited in Comment, Exhaustion of Remedies in Private, Voluntary
Associations, 65 YALE L.J. 369, 378 n.60 (1955).

57. See, e.g., Born v. Cease, 101 F. Supp. 473, 475 (D. Alaska 1951), afdsub
non Born v. Laude, 213 F.2d 407 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,348 U.S. 855 (1954).
58. Rensch v. General Drivers, 268 Minn. 307, 314, 129 N.W.2d 341,346 (1964).
59. See Comment, supranote 34, at 382.
60. If the suspended doctor has left the community, determining the location of
the appeal could become burdensome.
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come is damaged by the suspension or the accusation of wrongdoing.
"[I]t is probable that the restriction of a physician's privileges redounds to his detriment in the eyes of other physicians who customarily refer patients to him for treatment and probably reduces his
income."' 6 1 For a surgeon, like Dr. Archer, loss of hospital privileges
is most detrimental since one clearly cannot practice without operating facilities.
The doctor's reputation is also impugned by a suspension or an
accusation of wrongdoing. Once damaged, a reputation is extremely
difficult to rebuild. Even though the physician may eventually be
cleared of the charges or be reinstated by the hospital, his profesand consequently his practice, may be irreparably
sional reputation,
62
damaged.
A court must weigh all these factors before requiring a plaintiff
to exhaust internal remedies prior to judicial intervention. If harm
to the plaintiff outweighs the benefit to the hospital and the judicial
system, the court should apply the exception to the doctrine and allow an appeal directly to the judiciary.
C.

Inadequate Procedures

The courts are also willing to find an exception to the exhaustion doctrine when the hospital procedures are found to be inadequate. This exception was important in Eidelson, since the court
examined the adequacy of the hospital's internal procedures before
requiring exhaustion of these procedures by Dr. Archer. "The exhaustion requirement has been dispensed with where the administrative remedy is inadequate . . . . We must therefore assess the
adequacy of the hospital's internal procedures. ' 63 This exception is
often allowed when the plaintiff is not given due notice, a hearing, or
an unbiased appellate tribunal. 64
It is clear from the court's opinion that a physician will be exempt from exhausting the hospital's remedies if the procedures are
found to be inadequate. It is less clear what this court and future
courts will consider to be adequate. Full constitutional due process
is required when a physician is dismissed from a public or quasi61. Citta v. Delaware Valley Hosp., 313 F. Supp. 301, 309 (E.D. Pa. 1970), disapprovedon othergrounds, Hodge v. Paoli Mem. Hosp., 546 F.2d 563 (3d Cir. 1978)
(receipt of Hill-Burton funds does not constitute state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976)).
62. See Note, supra note 13, at 1370.
63. Eidelson, 645 P.2d at 181 (citations omitted).
64. See Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soe'y of Orthodontists, 12 Cal. 3d 541, 553, 526
P.2d 253, 262, 112 Cal. Rptr. 245, 254 (1974); Swital v. Real Estate Comm'r, 116
Cal. App. 2d 677, 679, 254 P.2d 587, 588 (1953); Malmstead v. Minneapolis Aerie,
111 Minn. 119, 122, 126 N.W. 486, 487 (1910).
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public hospital. 65 Although private associations and hospitals need
not provide the same degree of due process, they must provide some
modicum of procedural safeguards.
In Eidelson, the Alaska Supreme Court did not decide whether
the hospital was public or private.6 6 The court stated:
[I]t is unclear whether the hospital in this case should be held to
the constitutional due process standard. We conclude, however,
that where a hospital seeks to assert an exhaustion of remedies
defense to a physician's challenge of the suspension of his hospital
privileges, our assessment of the adequacy of the internal remedies
includes 67a determination of the availability of an impartial
tribunal.
The court also considered Archer's right to appeal and right to a
hearing prior to suspension
in its assessment of the adequacy of the
68
internal procedures.
Though the court examined these three factors, the question still
remained as to exactly which procedures would be deemed adequate. This lack of clarity arises from the court's examination of
certain hospital procedures without clearly stating whether those are
the only safeguards needed for an adequate internal process. The
court should articulate guidelines for what it considers to be proper
internal procedures. Hospitals need guidance so that constitutions,
bylaws, and staff contracts can conform to the court's requirements.
Guidelines would also allow hospitals to correct their own procedural errors without the need for judicial intervention, thus preserving hospital autonomy. Supreme court standards for adequate
procedures would also aid lower courts to initially determine the validity of the hospital's remedies. A set of guidelines would enable
the courts to apply the requirements uniformly, leading to fair administration of justice.
1. Alaska Guidelinesfor Adequate Procedures. In the Edelson

case, the supreme court began developing guidelines for adequate
internal procedures. The court examined the hospital's hearing and
review procedures and the impartiality of the deciding tribunal.6 9
Since it singled out these elements, the court must have considered
them to be vital to an adequate internal process.
a. Hearing. Traditionally, in a private hospital, revocation of
staff privileges was within the board's complete discretion. A physician had a right to a hearing only if the right was created in the
65. Storrs v. Lutheran Hosp. & Homes Soc'y, 609 P.2d 24, 28 (Alaska 1980)
aft'd, 661 P.2d 632 (Alaska 1983).
66. 645 P.2d at 175 n.13.
67. Id at 181.
68. Id at 180-82.
69. See infra notes 70-84 and accompanying text.
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bylaws or his contract. 70 This autonomy of private hospitals, how-

ever, appears to have given way as the courts increasingly require
that there be some internal hearing to address the complaint before
they will apply the exhaustion doctrine. 71 If no hearing procedure
exists, courts will exempt the plaintiff from exhausting
the internal
72
remedies and allow him to proceed straight to court.
The Eidelson court followed this trend. Although the bylaws
provided for a hearing, the court, by stating that it would examine
the adequacy of the procedures and the impartiality of the tribunal
in all cases where the defense of the exhaustion of remedies is used,
implied that the plaintiff had a right to a hearing.73 Thus, it appears
that, under the Eidelson opinion, an internal system is not adequate
unless it provides for some type of hearing. The court did not, however, discuss the type of hearing required.
b. Timing of the Hearing. A second important procedural aspect is the timing of the hearing. The issue is whether the hearing
must be held prior to or after the revocation of privileges. The
proper time for a hearing is usually determined by weighing the hospital's and patients' interests in a summary suspension against the
physician's interest in a hearing prior to suspension.74 The Eidelson
court interpreted the hospital's bylaws as providing for summary action without a hearing whenever immediate action was in the best
interest of the patients.75 If no immediate and legitimate threat to
patient welfare exists, a hearing before suspension may be appropriate. In a case such as this a pre-suspension hearing protects the physician's reputation without harming patients or the hospital. When
the potential danger to patients is both great and immediate, however, it is more reasonable to allow a summary revocation with a
hearing as soon after revocation as possible.76 Thus, at the very
least, the court appears to be calling for a hearing before corrective
action unless there is an overriding interest in patient welfare. In
Eidelson, the court held that the interests of the hospital and its patients did 77outweigh Archer's interest in, a hearing prior to
suspension.
70. See Note, supra note 13, at 1356-57.
71. See, e.g., Garrow v. Elizabeth Gen. Hosp. & Dispensary, 79 N.J. 549, 564,
401 A.2d 533, 541 (1979); Ascherman v. San Francisco Medical Soc'y, 39 Cal. App.
3d 623, 648, 114 Cal. Rptr. 681, 697 (1974).
72. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
73. 645 P.2d at 181.
74. See Note, supra note 13, at 1370.
75. 645 P.2d at 180.
76. See Cilia, 313 F. Supp. at 309.
77. 645 P.2d at 180.
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c. InternalAppeal. The basic right to appeal the initial decision is another procedural requirement recognized in the Eidelson
opinion.7 8 Without a right to appeal there is no further internal remedy to exhaust; thus, there is no need to apply the doctrine. An adequate remedy, therefore, must contain a provision granting the
physician a right to appeal.
d. Impartial Tribunal. According to the Alaska Supreme
Court, adequate internal remedies require that the case be decided
by an impartial tribunal.7 9 When "the functions of investigating,
prosecuting, and adjudicating have been combined in the same person, due process has been violated." 80 Although this constitutional
due process standard is usually applied exclusively to public institu8
tions, the court applied it to the private hospital in Eidelson. 1
The court did not require that those ultimately deciding the issue have absolutely no connection with the case prior to the hearing.
"The fact that the executive committee [of the board] becomes involved with the case prior to the proposed suspension hearing does
not mean that the board was automatically biased. 8' 2 The earlier
adoption of an ex parte recommendation concerning the physician in
83
question was not enough prior involvement to taint the tribunal.
Courts have held that the tribunal is presumed to be impartial, and
that no exception to the exhaustion of remedies doctrine will be allowed even when a minority of the tribunal has had too much prior
involvement or is found to be biased. 84 Impartiality, however, must
always be examined to determine whether the tribunal is, in fact,
capable of fairly evaluating the physician.
In sum, the Eidelson decision sets out four basic factors which
could be used as guidelines by lower courts in determining the adequacy of the internal remedies: a hearing, a right to an appeal, a
hearing prior to suspension when patient welfare is not threatened,
and an impartial tribunal to hear the appeal. While these constitute
the beginning of a comprehensive set of guidelines, other jurisdictions require additional procedures which the court should consider.
78. Id at 182.
79. Id at 181.
80. Storrs, 609 P.2d at 28 n.12.
81. See 645 P.2d at 182-83.
82. Id at 183. In Eidelson the executive board met on August 29, 1977, and
adopted Doctor Ivy's ex parte recommendation that Archer's suspension should be
extended and the investigation continued. This board also comprised the applicable
tribunal. Id at 182.
83. Id at 183.
84. See, e.g., Correia v. Supreme Lodge of Portuguese Fraternity, 218 Mass.
305, 309, 105 N.E. 977, 979 (1914); Way v. Patton, 195 Or. 36, 60, 241 P.2d 895, 906

(1952).
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2. GuidelinesforAdequate Proceduresin OtherJurisdictions.In
deciding to require exhaustion of remedies in a private hospital, the
Alaska Supreme Court looked to California and New Jersey decisions. The next logical step is for the court to examine the procedures
insisted upon by these two states for adequate internal remedies.
New Jersey was one of the first states to blur the public-private
hospital distinction in determining the requirements for internal procedures. Under the traditional rule regarding private hospitals, no
procedures are required, and no judicial review is allowed unless a
plaintiff can prove breach of contract, violation of hospital bylaws,
or a staff conspiracy. 85 The New Jersey Supreme Court, in Greisman
8 6 swept aside the traditional rule of publicv. Newcomb Hospital,
private dichotomy and went beyond the distinction of public, quasipublic, and private hospitals which the Alaska courts later adopted.
The New Jersey court reasoned that although hospitals may be privately owned, they receive public support and are devoted to the
public function of serving the sick and injured. 87 Hospitals have
been described as owing a fiduciary duty to the public.8 8 Since hospitals serve the public interest, they should be subject to procedural
requirements which place a check on potentially arbitrary and capricious decisions by the hospital board. Greisman also indicates that a
physician has the right to be treated fairly.89
In California, the "unmistakable trend of the judicial decisions
and legislative enactments. . . supports the principle that a private
hospital may not deprive a physician of staff privileges without giving him minimal due process of law protection." 90 This approach is
consistent with the history of the exhaustion doctrine under California common law. At common law, the plaintiff had a right to fair
procedures. The court in James v. Marinshio Corp.9 ' held that a labor union could not dismiss members without a fair proceeding.
The idea of fair procedure has been expanded beyond the labor
union context to include professional societies and staff decisions in
private hospitals. For example, the court in Pinsker v. Pacific Coast
Society of Orthodontists92 explained that fair procedure included ad93
equate notice of charges and a reasonable opportunity to respond.
85. See Ludlam, Physician-HospitalRelations: The Role of Staff Privileges,35
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 879, 885 (1970).
86. 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963).

87. Id at 404, 192 A.2d at 825.
88. Guerroro v. Burlington City Memorial Hosp., 70 N.J. 344, 361, 360 A.2d
334, 343 (1976) (Pashman, J., dissenting).
89. 40 N.J. at 403-04, 192 A.2d at 825.
90. Ascherman, 39 Cal. App. 3d at 648, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
91. 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1945).
92. 12 Cal. 3d 541, 526 P.2d 253, 116 Cal. Rptr. 245 (1974).
93. Id, at 555, 526 P.2d at 264, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 255; see also Ezekial v. Win-
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The more recent California decisions have continued to define adesafequate notice and reasonableopportunity; they now require the
94
guards discussed below as part of these "fair procedure[s]."
a. Notice of Hearing, Written Statement of Charges, and the
Right to Confront Witnesses. Like Alaska, the California and New
Jersey courts require that an adequate internal procedure include a

hearing before the decisional board. These two states, however, go
one step further by demanding that the physician be given notice of
his right to a hearing 95 within sufficient time to allow the physician
to prepare an adequate defense. 96 At the same time notice of the

hearing is given, the doctor should be provided with a written statement of the charges against him.97 The statement should be detailed
enough to apprise the doctor of the specific charges against him. A
detailed statement of charges is essential to the preparation of an
adequate defense.
While the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses is required under the United States Constitution pursuant to the due process clause, both California and New Jersey agree that this right is

not an absolute requirement in hearings before a private hospital

board. 98 As a practical matter, the right to confront witnesses is impossible to effectuate in some instances because a hospital board possesses no subpoena power. 99 Therefore, the doctor's right to
confrontation is necessarily restricted to those persons who voluntarily testify at the hearing.1°°
b. Right to Counsel The courts of California and New Jersey,
like many commentators, 10 1 disagree on whether counsel may attend
and participate in the hearing. The California Supreme Court in
kley, 20 Cal. 3d 267, 273-74, 572 P.2d 32, 36, 142 Cal. Rptr. 418, 422 (1977) (such
minimal procedures are required because the right to practice a lawful trade is sufficiently fundamental and valuable to warrant protection from arbitrary action).
94. See, e.g., Westlake Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 465, 551
P.2d 410, 131 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1976); Ascherman, 39 Cal. App. 3d 623, 114 Cal. Rptr.
681.
95. See Westlake, 17 Cal. 3d at 485, 551 P.2d at 417, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 97; Pinsker, 12 Cal. 2d at 555, 526 P.2d at 263, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 255; Ascherman, 39 Cal.
App. 3d at 649, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 697; Guerroro, 70 N.J. at 359, 360 A.2d at 342.
96. See Aschernan, 39 Cal. App. 3d at 649, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 697; Guerroro,70
N.J. at 359, 360 A.2d at 342.
97. See Ascherman, 39 Cal. App. at 649, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 697; Garrow, 79 N.J.
at 564, 401 A.2d at 541; Guerroro, 70 N.J. at 359, 360 A.2d at 342.
98. See Ascherman, 39 Cal. App. 3d at 649, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 697; Garrow,79
N.J. at 566, 401 A.2d at 542.
99. See Ascherman, 39 Cal. App. 3d at 649, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 697; Garrow,79
N.J. at 566, 401 A.2d at 542.
100. See Aseherman, 39 Cal. App. 3d at 649, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 697; Garrow,79
N.J. at 566, 401 A.2d at 542.
101. See Note, The Right to Counsel at HospitalHearings-One View, 101 N.J.
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Ascherman v. San FranciscoMedical Society 02 held that it is within
the discretion of the hospital board to determine whether counsel is
required.
Participation of counsel would probably not be necessary unless
the hospital's attorney is used in the proceeding or the extreme
nature of the charges involved indicated that representation by an
attorney would be advantageous. Such a limitation would not
preclude a doctor from consulting an attorney prior to the hearing
even though the attorney was not allowed to participate in the
hearing itself.103
New Jersey courts, on the other hand, found that while the
counsel's role may be limited because of the lack of an opportunity
to cross-examine adverse witnesses, he should still have the opportunity to advise the doctor during the hearing and should be allowed to
present evidence and an argument to the board. In Garrow v. Elizabeth Hospital & Dispensary,the court held: "In view of the physician's substantial interest in proceedings of this nature, on balance
we believe that the physician should have the right to have counsel
present at mandated hospital hearings . . ....
104 Under this view,
however, the attorney's role in the hearing is subject to reasonable
05
rules promulgated by the hospital.
c. Standardfor Review. Both California and New Jersey require that the reviewing board's final decision be written and based
on the record. 10 6 The standard for review, however, is different in
each state. The California court in Ascherman felt that the basis for
the decision must "come from substantial evidence which was produced at the hearing."' 07 The board's decision cannot be based
upon ex parte communications not revealed to the doctor prior to
trial.'0 8 The New Jersey court applied a more liberal standard, requiring that the record "contain sufficient reliable evidence, even
though hearsay in nature, to justify the result."' 1 9 That court determined that the substantial evidence rule was unwarranted in light of
the nature of the hearing."10
L.J. 92 (1978). But see Note, The Right to Counsel at Hospital Hearings Why Not.,
101 N.J. L.J. 116 (1978).
102. 39 Cal. App. 3d 623, 114 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1974).
103. Id at 649, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 697 (quoting Silver v. Castle Memorial Hosp.,
53 Hawaii 475, 484-85, 497 P.2d 564, 571-72, cert. denied,409 U.S. 1048 (1972).
104. 79 N.J. 549, 566, 401 A.2d 533, 542 (1979).
105. See id
106. See Ascherman, 39 Cal. App. 3d at 649, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 697; Garrow,79
N.J. at 555, 401 A.2d at 541.
107. 39 Cal. App. 3d at 649, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
108. See id
109. Garrow,79 N.J. at 565, 401 A.2d at 542.
110. See id.
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None of these procedures are inconsistent with the Alaska
Supreme Court's requirements of a hearing, an appeal, and an
impartial tribunal. New Jersey and California merely have defined
more fully the type of hearing and other procedural safeguards that
are required for an adequate internal remedy. These two states have
moved very close to announcing that adequate internal procedures
of a private hospital must include many of the elements of constitutional due process. The Alaska Supreme Court should incorporate
these additional procedures into future guidelines for internal hospital proceedings.
V.

CONCLUSION: IMPACT OF THE END OF THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE
DICHOTOMY

The Alaska Supreme Court, by requiring exhaustion of remedies in private hospitals, has opened the floodgates for judicial involvement in the workings of private hospitals. Applying the
doctrine and its numerous exceptions is impossible without scrutinizing procedures and decisions that previously were beyond judicial
review. The adequacy of a hospital's internal procedures must now
be examined. Adequate internal procedures must provide some fundamental safeguards to protect the physician against potentially arbitrary and capricious decisions by the hospital's board. To aid the
lower courts in determining if a hospital's procedures are adequate,
the Alaska Supreme Court should describe procedures it would consider adequate.
In determining which procedures and safeguards are required,
the Alaska Supreme Court must decide whether it, like the courts of
California and New Jersey, will continue to blur the bright-line distinction between public and private hospitals. Most of the procedures required by California and New Jersey are derived from the
constitutional due process standards required in public hospitals. If
the Alaska court intends to require some procedural safeguards in a
private hospital, it need not distinguish between public and private
institutions. Once a hearing is required, different procedures are not
needed because the interests of the private and public hospitals are
Having already opened the door by resubstantially the same.'
quiring a hearing, the court should follow the New Jersey and California lead and require many of the same procedures for both public
and private hospitals.
This outcome is probably not what the Alaska Hospital and
Medical Center intended to achieve by raising the exhaustion doctrine as a defense in Eidelson. The hospital, in defending this suit,
111. See Note, supra note 13, at 1361.
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sought to preserve its autonomy and prevent judicial intervention in
its private decisionmaking processes. The hospital may have won
the initial battle, but the war for autonomy and freedom from governmental and judicial intervention has been lost.
Karen A. A viles

